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CALCULATING DAMAGES FOR PAIN AND
SUFFERING: THE MATHEMATICAL
FORMULA DEVICE
Because personal injury actions comprise about seventy percent of
all litigation,' courts must regularly confront the problem of assessing
damages for pain and suffering.2 A source of difficulty is the fact that
pain and suffering are subjective in nature and hence insusceptible of
objective evaluation in terms of money. Hypothesizing that the basic
objective of tort damages is the substantial restoration of the victim to
the position he enjoyed prior to the occurrence of the tort, the question
remains whether criteria can be established to aid in determining the
monetary equivalent of his resultant pain and suffering.
When a chattel is lost as the result of a tort, the jury can be guided
by reasonably definite standards, for most chattels are easily replaced,
and their value readily determined. In a situation involving pain and
suffering, however, not only is restoration in specie impossible, but it
is also unrealistic for a court to instruct a jury to award as compen-
sation the cost of having a reasonable man undergo plaintiff's pain and
suffering.3 Indeed, if such a criterion were literally applied, verdicts
would reach astronomical proportions, for no reasonable man would
undergo pain and suffering for any amount of money.
In an effort to cope with this dilemma, the courts have applied the
test of what is "fair and reasonable compensation" under the circum-
stances.4 But this nebulous test, like all standards based on reason-
ableness, suffers inherent difficulties in administration, for the jury,
in determining what is "reasonable," is left to its own devices, and the
basis, if any, of the resulting verdict is rarely ascertainable. The only
checks on the jury award in such cases are: (1) the trial judge's
power to set aside an award and grant a new trial where the award
was "so grossly excessive as to show that it was actuated by passion,
prejudice, or partiality, or was based on some mistake as to the law
or facts,"5 or, (2) the vague principles of increscitur and remittitur,"
whereby the appellate court either increases or decreases the judgment
1. Belli, Demonstrative Evidence And The Adequate Award, 22 Miss. L.3. 284,
286 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Belli].
2. For a brief, general discussion of this problem see McCormick, Damages
§ 88 (1935).
3. See, e.g., Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R.R., 177 Pa. 1, 35 Atl. 191 (1896).
4. See, e.g., Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Mo. 1959).
5. McCormick, Damages § 18, at 71 (1935).
6. See generally McCormick, Damages § 19 (1935).
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below or commands either a partial (on the issues of damages only)
or complete retrial of the controversy.
As a consequence of this underlying uncertainty, there is increasing
disagreement on the question of what opposing counsel may include in
their presentation to the jury. Since, as noted above, damages for pain
and suffering are not susceptible to reduction to monetary value, it
follows that the plaintiff, in an action for pain and suffering need not
prove the extent or equivalent in money damages of his loss or injury
-as in the case of pecuniary damage. Possibly because of this de-
creased burden of proof, evidence allowed in to sustain the burden is
limited. For example, opinions or estimates of witnesses as to amount
of damages have often been held inadmissible.7 Generally, if counsel
is permitted at all to persuade the jurors to accept what he believes
to be a reasonable figure, it must be in the oral argument.,
This note will discuss generally what arguments in terms of the size
of an award for pain and suffering can be directed to a jury. More
specifically, an evaluation will be made of a technique of recent origin
which presents to the panel a mathematical basis for calculating dam-
ages for pain and suffering.
A striking example of the utilization of the mathematical formula
device is seen in Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line PR.R., 9 where counsel
argued from the following chart: 0
"Mike" Braddock
Age 9 Expectancy 56 years
Pain and Suffering to date 395 days
Experience of accident 5,000.00
Hospital 3/25-4/5/52 1,200.00
First 30 days at home 300.00
To date 353 days 700.00
Inability to Lead Normal Life
3/25-5/31/52 crutches 340.00
6/1-10/31/52 pylon 459.00
11/1/25 to date artificial limb 348.00
Humiliation and Embarrassment 1,915.00
10,262.00
7. See McCormick, Damages § 14 (1935).
8. This conclusion follows from an appreciation of the restrictions imposed
upon admissible evidence as set out by McCormick, Damages § 14 (1935).
9. 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955).
10. Seaboard Airline R.R. v. Braddock, 96 So. 2d 127, 129 (1957).
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20,440 days Future 56 yrs.
Medical
Checkup by doctor once a year 440.00
Artificial legs 3,600.00
Repairs and Maintenance 2,640.00
Stump socks 985.00
Extra pants, shoes and socks 4,400.00
Limb adjustment every 2 weeks 2,912.00
14,977.00
Pain and Suffering 20,440 days 20,440.00
Humiliation and Embarrassment 20,440 days 40,880.00
Inability to Lead a Normal Life 20,440 days 40,880.00
Loss of Earning Capacity 121,000.00
5500 x 50% x 56
Total 248,439.0011
In practice this mathematical technique works roughly as follows.
Either at the outset of the trial, in his opening statement, or in the
final summation after each party has rested its case, plaintiff's attor-
ney will display to the jury a chart similar to that in the Braddock
situation. Written at the top is usually plaintiff's name, age and life
expectancy based on actuarial tables,12 followed by an itemized list of
damages or alleged damages. In the pain and suffering category the
usual tactic is a breakdown of the life expectancy of the victim into
month, weeks, days, hours or even seconds. Thus a life expectancy of
56 years may be represented as 20,440 days, as in the Braddock case,
490,560 hours or 1,760,016,000 seconds. Following this computation,
counsel will typically suggest the following hypothetical question:
"Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. . . .Let's take Pat, my client,
down to the waterfront. He sees Mike, an old friend. He goes up
to him and says, 'Mike, I've got a job for you. It's a perfect job.
You're not going to have to work any more for the rest of your
life and the best part of this job is once you agree to take it, you'll
never lose it. As a matter of fact, you can't lose it. You don't have
to do any work and you get five bucks a day for the rest of your
life. ... All you have to do is trade me your good back for my
bad one and I'll give you five dollars a day for the rest of your life.
11. The items in the chart labelled "Pain and Suffering, Humiliation and
Embarrassment," and "Inability to Lead a Normal Life" are all to be discussed
under the general heading of "Pain and Suffering" in this note. The total of
these damages is $102,200 (plus $7,000 for "Experience of accident" and other
items under the first heading of the chart). This amount is computed by assessing
five dollars per day for 20,440 days or 56 years.
12. Bell at 316.
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Do you know what five dollars a day for the rest of your life is?
Why that's $60,000! I realize that . . . you're going to have to
have excruciating pain and suffering with this job, thirty-one
million seconds a year, and once you take it on, you'll never be
able to relieve yourself of this, but you get $60,000.' "13
As a follow-up the jurors are then asked whether they think "Mike"
would accept the proposition.'4
Besides the usual chart illustration, skilled practitioners will use a
blackboard and carry out each calculation in minute detail. 15 Indeed,
attorneys often intentionally miscalculate to a lower figure in hopes
that the jury will "follow the complete computation in their own
minds" and catch the mistake.,6 The important effect of such minute
calculation is illustrated by the fact that jurors have been observed
copying figures presented by plaintiff's counsel, 1. and some judges
have prohibited such practice., 8
Despite increasing utilization of the formulary approach, however,
its propriety is currently a subject of much debate, with the writers
and courts disagreeing on whether the method should be tolerated. 9
13. Id. at 319. This is referred to as the "job offer" method. See, e.g., Faught v.
Washam, supra note 4.
14. Belli at 319. It should be pointed out that attorneys in some states are not
permitted to ask the jury "Would you change places with the plaintiff for 200
per hour?" Id. at 322.
15. Belli at 313.
16. Id. at 322.
17. Bradford, How to Talk Dollars and Cents to the Jury, 1959 Ins. L.J. 567,
573.
18. Ibid.
19. The following cases and articles approve of and lend support to the formu-
lary approach: McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 588, 104 So. 2d 315 (1958) (with
qualifications); Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959);
Braddock v. Seaboard Airline R.R., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955) (where in spite of
language to the contrary, in the ultimate decision the court endorsed use of a
blackboard); Aetna Oil Co. v. Metcalf, 298 Ky. 706, 183 S.W.2d 637 (1944)
(dictum); Flaherty v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R., 251 Minn. 345, 87 N.W.2d
633 (1958); Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30
(1956) (use "for purely illustrative purposes" permitted) i 4-County Elec. Power
Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss* 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954). See Belli, Demonstrative
Evidence And The Adequate Award, 22 Miss. L.J. 284 (1951); Comment, 36 Dicta
373 (1959); Comment, 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 522 (1958); Comment, 4 Vill. L. Rev.
137 (1959). But see the following cases and secondary authorities which do not
approve of the "formulary approach": Henne v. Balick 146 A.2d 394 (Del. 1958);
AhIstrom v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie R.R., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d
873 (1955) ; Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958) ; Warren Petroleum
Corp. v. Pyeat, 275 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). See Bradford, How to
Talk Dollars and Cents to the Jury, 1959 Ins. L.J. 567 [hereinafter cited as Brad-
ford]; Comment, 19 Ohio St. L.J. 780 (1959); Comment, 61 W.Va. L. Rev. 302
(1959). It should be noted that Pennsylvania may be considered as a state re-
jecting the formulary approach, since the courts there have uniformly permitted
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1960/iss3/5
306 'WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Several arguments have been advanced in opposition to the use of
such a technique: (1) If an "expert witness" were to offer an opinion
on the amount to be awarded for pain and suffering such testimony
clearly would be inadmissible as a usurpation of the jury function,
and therefore expression of counsel's opinion via the formula device
should likewise be inadmissible.20 (2) There is real danger that if
the per diem (or other mathematical) approach is permitted, the
calculations will become, in the eyes of the jury, "kissing cousins of
evidence."21 (3) Defense counsel is placed in the unfair position of
having to rebut that which has no basis in fact.22 Assuming the de-
fendant attempts to negate a proposed valuation, "he must necessarily
inject as further factual suggestions valuations which again are in-
capable of proof. By doing so, he fortifies his adversary's implication
that the law recognizes pain and suffering as having been evaluated
and as capable of being evaluated on such basis.' ' 23 (4) The break-
down into days, hours or seconds tends to mislead the jury as to the
resulting total amount of the verdict.24 An award of one-dollar an
hour, for example, does not seem so great an amount as a total of
$262,080, the lump sump payment on the basis of a 30 year life ex-
pectancy.25 (5) The value of pain and suffering cannot be estimated
on a per diem basis because "the degree thereof differs in individuals.
In the same individual pain is not consistent but varies from day to
day."26 (6) The jury is instructed by the court to use its own judg-
ment in deciding the amount to be awarded, yet where the mathemati-
cal device is permitted the judgment of counsel tends to control in-
no mention of money to the jury. See, e.g., Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R.R., 177
Pa. 1, 35 Ati. 191 (1896). There are some cases cited as upholding the formula
device, however, which should not be cited for that proposition. See e.g., Imperial
Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4, 11 (6th Cir. 1956), where the case was tried without
a jury and the appellate tribunal merely held that the use of the device was not
"manifestly unjust" as a matter of law.
20. See, e.g., Faught v. Washam, supra note 4, where the court expressed
dislike of the per diem basis but refused to reverse solely on that ground.
21. Bradford at 571. See, e.g., Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste.
Marie R.R., supra note 19. Also, it can be argued logically here that if the defense
fails to refute satisfactorily the rate proposed, the jury might conceivably con-
sider itself bound by plaintiff's "undisputed evidence."
22. Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
23. Id. at 724.
24. This is merely a suggested argument, and no authority could be found to
support it.
25. If a flat figure of $262,080 were suggested for pain and suffering conceiv-
ably it could appear excessive, especially since compensation for medical expenses
and other actual monetary loss is prayed for in addition.
26. Henne v. Balick, supra note 19.
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stead.27 (7) The blackboard with detailed calculations, a procedural
characteristic of the approach, produces highly detrimental effects, for
it serves to place per diem estimates in a more persuasive position
than admissible evidence by attracting two senses rather than one.
When employed in the opening argument the "blackboard" formula
remains more firmly implanted in the juror's memory than much of
the evidence subsequently introduced.2s Also, if blackboard calcula-
tions of plaintiff's counsel remain in sight during the defense argu-
ment, the effect would closely resemble the former standing behind
defense counsel and making faces.29
On the other hand, proponents of the device contend: (1) Uni-
versally the appraisal of damages is within the jury's province, but
the verdict must be consistent with the evidence. 30 Hence it follows
that any decision must be inferable from the evidence, and therefore,
since counsel possess the right to argue reasonable inferences from the
evidence,31 their comments or opinions regarding the monetary value
of pain and suffering are permissible.32 (2) Since these damages are
incapable of accurate measurement, some guidance should be afforded
the jury by counsel, and any danger that such guidance will be mis-
taken for evidence can be obviated by proper instruction.3 (3) The
formula technique is exploited merely for illustrative purposes and is
not offered as evidence.34 (4) Inasmuch as defendant is a tortfeasor,35
a valuable criterion for jury decision should not be eliminated in def-
27. A precise illustration of this tendency is seen in Braddock v. Seaboard
Airline R.R., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955), where the jury returned a verdict of$248,439, the exact figure calculated on plaintiff's chart. This seems to have
horrified the New Jersey court in Botta v. Brunner, supra note 22, and the Mis-
souri court in the Faught case, supra note 4. See also Bradford at 572.
28. See, e.g., 4-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 224 Miss. 403, 433, 73 So.
2d 144, 152 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
29. Hinshaw, Use and Abuse of Demonstrative Evidence: The Art of Jury
Persuasion, 40 A.B.A.J. 479, 542 (1954). The relevance of this argument is illus-
trated in the 4-County case, supra note 28, where the court said that charts usedby plaintiff's counsel should not remain in view of the jury during defendant's
opening argument or subsequent testimony. 73 So. 2d at 151.
30. See McCormick, Damages §18 (1935).
31. See 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1806 (3d ed. 1940).
32. See, e.g., 4-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, supra note 28. See also
Comment, 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 522, 524 (1958).
33. See, e.g., Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 941 (1956). See also Comment, 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 522, 523 (1958);
Mills, Damages-Pain and Suffering-Per Diem Argument to Jury, 36 Dicta 373,
374 (1959).
34. See Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30(1956). See also Mills, Damages-Pain and Suffering-Per Diem Argument to
Jury, 36 Dicta 373, 374 (1959).
35. See Comment, 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 522, 524 (1958).
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erence to him, especially since defense counsel can employ his own
chart or formula.36 In short, it is really not unfair for plaintiff to enjoy
a stronger position. 7 (5) Most courts have accepted "lump sum" sug-
gestions by counsel38 and therefore it follows logically that explanation
of the components of the total should be permitted. 31 (6) Some trial
courts, sitting without a jury, have arrived at verdicts through the use
of similar mathematical formulae. 40 (7) Assuming the court's accept-
ance of the approach, there should be no objection to the use of a chart
or blackboard, subject of course to the discretion of the trial court as
with all offers of demonstrative evidence. 41 (8) Conceivably the pres-
ence of such recommendations by counsel would aid appellate tribunals
in their determination of the bases of the jury findings.
Thus it appears that the attitudes of judges and lawyers on the
mathematical formula question is far from settled. In resolving the
controversy, however, an important additional factor requires con-
sideration. Assuming that the utilization of a formula results in higher
verdicts,42 prejudicial effect cannot be demonstrated except on the as-
36. Note, Per Diem Measurement of Pain and Suffering as Prejudicial Argu-
ment, 19 Ohio St. L.J. 780, 782 (1958).
37. See Comment, 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 522, 524 (1958).
38. There are surprisingly few states which have passed on the question of
whether counsel may suggest a lump sum to the jury. See cases cited in Bradford
at 573. Apparently, however, this is customarily permitted in the vast majority
of states. Id. at 570.
39. It would seem that many objections to the use of a formula would apply to
a "lump sum" as well, although perhaps to a lesser degree.
40. See, e.g., Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, supra note 33.
41. See 4-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 224 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144
(1954).
42. Unfortunately, there is no available statistical study on what constitutes
an adequate award. In any event, however, such a study would include at most
an opinion poll as to whether or not juries are rendering satisfactory results.
The National Association of Claimant's and Compensation Attorneys (NACCA)
has been contending that awards are inadequate. One of the foremost spokesmen
of this group, Belli, has attemped to demonstrate this view by a comparison of
early and recent awards in terms of dollar value. Belli, The Adequate Award,
39 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1951). On the other hand, however, Plant, in Damages for
Pain and Suffering, 19 Ohio St. L.J. 200, 211 (1958), concludes, after examination
of recent cases, that awards for pain and suffering have been too high. He sug-
gests that awards be limited to 50% of the "medical, nursing and hospital ex-
penses." Ibid. He reasons that the pain and suffering is roughtly proportional to the
amount of injury and hence proportional to the amount of expenses for personal
injury. Neither side, however, has much in the way of information to support
its conclusions. For the past few years The Jury Project at the University of
Chicago Law School has been analyzing the jury process, but as yet there is no
report available. In a note concerning adequacy of awards in West Virginia, the
author attempted to ascertain the adequacy of jury awards by comparison of
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sumption that awards for pain and suffering have been adequate with-
out the device.43 There has been considerable debate recently concern-
ing the adequacy of awards. Under present limitations on our knowl-
edge of economic and social consequences of awards of varying size,
however, adequacy can only be determined by consensus of opinion.
However, it seems that any trend toward higher judgments could be
checked somewhat by alert action of defense counsel. In the Braddock
case," for example, advocates for the defendant could have explained
to the panel that the amounts received by plaintiff on the verdict could
be invested to accumulate interest, thereby resulting in greater com-
pensation than the jury anticipated.'5 Further, the defense could sug-
gest its own formula, utilizing plaintiff's actuarial tables and cate-
gories, and conceivably reduce the subsequent judgment.46
Aside from the fact that effective defenses against the formula exist,
however, it seems that the jury, which under the present state of the
law can receive no effective guidance from the court in its decision on
pain and suffering, should receive assistance from opposing counsel.
Since the decision must assign money damages, the arguments should
discuss cash values, and logically the sums requested should be reduced
to their component parts as an illustration to the jury of how they
verdicts in that state with those in others. He concluded that verdicts in West
Virginia were insufficient. Note, 60 W.Va. L. Rev. 339 (1958). See also, Note,
6 Utah L. Rev. 244 (1958), which discusses inadequacy of damages in that state.
43. This is merely an assumption, for there are too few decisions in support.
Judgements of the same proportion as in the Braddock case have been rendered
apparently without utilization of a formula. Belli, The Adequate Award, 39 Cal.
L. Rev. 1 (1951).
44. Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955).
45. Suppose plaintiff seeks $100,000 on a per diem basis of $5.00. At this rate
the jury would believe it was awarding $1,825 per year. But if plaintiff invested
the $100,000 lump sum payment at 2% he would receive, in addition to the $1,825
allowance, $2,000 in interest. Thus in a given year plaintiff would actually secure
$3,825 or more than twice the proposed yearly amount. Secondly, plaintiff could
purchase an annuity calculated to net him the $1,825 per year the jury believes
it is awarding, but the cost of such an annuity would be approximately $50,000,
or one-half the amount received. Similarly, if the entire $100,000 were invested
for that purpose, the annual payment would approach $4,000 or more than twice
the yearly rate calculated by plaintiff's attorney. Although this should be an im-
portant factor in any verdict, courts apparently do not instruct juries to determine
pain and suffering on the basis of present value. With other items of damages,
such as loss of earnings, such an instruction is common. See, e.g., Braddock v.
Seaboard Airline R.R., supra note 44, at 666. There is great likelihood therefore
that this present value concept is overlooked by triers of fact in determining the
value of pain and suffering.
46. This could be particularly effective, for any attempt of plaintiff to com-
pensate by raising the original figure per hour, for example, would lessen the
chance of jury acceptance of his formula.
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were derived.47 The formula device seems a reasonable technique to
this end, especially since it is available to both parties.
It is therefore submitted that courts which have rejected cash esti-
mates of counsel have acted too hastily. As previously indicated, this
is a technique of recent origin and hence has not yet been sufficiently
tested to determine whether its effects are prejudicial. 48 This suggests
that a policy of watchfulness and testing should be adopted prior to
any cursory elimination of this possible tool. If after a period of close
scrutiny it is decided that the device results in manifestly unfair ver-
dicts, the courts may thereafter prohibit the practice.40
However, should the mathematical approach survive such scrutiny,
rigid controls should be established upon its use, for any forensic tech-
nique is subject to abuse. First, "cash" discussions should not be per-
mitted in the opening statement, for their purpose is amply served by
restricting their use to the closing argument. Also, this would decrease
the possibility that they be mistaken for evidence. Secondly, the chart
or blackboard should be withdrawn from the jury's view immediately
following the argument wherein it is utilized.50 Third, where it is still
permitted, the question "Would you change places with the plaintiff
for 20 an hour?" should be prohibited, for it can serve only to mis-
lead the jury.51 The proper standard for compensation is that which
is "fair and reasonable under the circumstances." To suggest that an
individual might be induced to suffer physical injury for any amount
of money is unpalatable and implausible.2 Fourth, the jury should
be instructed that the proposed rates are for illustrative purposes only.
A suggested charge is as follows:
"Plaintiff has suggested a mathematical basis for computing
damages for pain and suffering. In assessing the amount of these
damages you must remember not to consider what it would cost
to hire someone to undergo the measure of pain alleged to have
been suffered. Rather you must decide what is fair and reasonable
compensation under the circumstances. If you desire you may use
the method suggested by plaintiff's attorney; or you may disre-
gard it. I must caution you that the mathematical formula and
47. See 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 1944, at 56 (3d ed. 1940).
48. Also, there apparently have been no counter-formulae offered by defense
counsel.
49. It should be noted that since there are no definite standards by which the
technique can be tested, final determination would be a mere matter of conjecture
and opinion. However, such a probationary period would be helpful in that mani-
festly unjust verdicts could be pointed out with reasonable accuracy.
50. A similar view was taken by the court in the 4-County case, supra note 28,
at 151.
51. See note 14 supra.
52. See Belli at 322.
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figures supplied by counsel have no basis in fact. You are in-
structed to disregard these figures, except as they are of value for
illustrative purposes."
Although the desirability of a mathematical formula is debatable, it
is submitted that it-at a minimum-holds some promise for handling
a difficult problem. It must be kept in mind that the total social and
economic impact of verdicts of different size is not assessable without
empirical studies not now available. Particularly in the absence of
such factual information and because no consensus has been reached
about the appropriateness of awards, it is urged that the technique
be utilized until such time as either factual studies are available or
until the results reached because of its use are clearly inconsistent
with any consensus which may be reached.
53. Elements of the suggested charge were taken from the language and rea-
soning of the following opinions: Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1959);
Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958) ; Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
177 Pa. 1, 35 Atl. 191 (1896).
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